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Economic Stabilization in Bulgaria via a Currency Board Arrangement 
Introduction 
According to the Central Intelligence Agency (2003), Bulgaria is located in Southeast 
Europe, with a size slightly larger than Tennessee and population of about 7. 5 million. After 
fighting on the losing side in both World Wars it fell in the Soviet sphere of influence. Since the 
end of Communist domination in 1990, Bulgaria began the contentious process of moving 
toward political democracy and market economy while combating inflation, unemployment, 
corruption, and crime. Also according to the site, Bulgaria experienced a major economic 
downturn in 1996, which led to the fall of the socialistic government of that time and brought to 
power a government committed to economic reform and responsible fiscal planning. 
But even though these facts appear accurate, this is not the image that the word 
"Bulgaria" evokes in me. As someone born in Sofia, Bulgaria, in 1981, I experienced the grim 
reality of communist Bulgaria. I also witnessed the enthusiastic and boundless hopes in the eyes 
of everyone around me when the Berlin wall fell in 1989 and saw later this same hope gradually 
disappear until it ultimately gave place to despair and anger. I remember the insecurity brought 
by the fact that in late 1996 my mom did not know how much money to take in order to buy 
bread and milk from the store, for in a matter of hours prices would skyrocket. But I also 
remember the joy and the sparks of new hope in everyone when, after persistent public protests, 
the socialist government gave up the political and economical power to the reform-minded right-
wing government. 
After the International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervened several times in 1996, including 
the extending multimillions in credit, the fund and Bulgaria finalized negotiations for a currency 
board implementation in 1997. An IMF representative in Bulgaria sums the results by stating 
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that "inflation has declined from over 1,000% in 1997 to less than 5% in 2002, ... growth has 
been robust since 1998 between 4% and 6%; the average Bulgarian worker now earns 40-50% 
more in real terms than in 1997," and poverty, which originally was 30% of the population, has 
declined to 10% (Sorsa, 2002). 
For my family, my friend's families, and me this means the possibility ofliving a normal 
life, without questioning if we would be able to survive the next day. This longed-for 
stabilization was satisfied by and large through the successful implementation of a currency 
board arrangement that Bulgaria accepted. 
Bulgaria's Economic Collapse in 1996 
The Bulgarian economy had been closely tied to the Soviet market during the forty-five 
years of communist regime in Bulgaria. The Internet-based Wikipedia (2003) states that 
Bulgaria's economy contracted dramatically after 1989 with the collapse of the Soviet system, 
bringing the standard ofliving to fall by about 40%. External shocks such as the United Nations 
(UN) sanctions against Serbia (1992-95) and Iraq further burdened the economy. The embargo 
on Serbia was placed in response to the Kosovo crisis and resulted in Bulgaria's loss of its most 
direct route towards West Europe. The 1991 trade embargo on Iraq and the Persian Gulf War 
negated agreements arranging for Iraq to repay some of its outstanding loans with Bulgaria via 
oil imports. According to the same source, some recovery signs were present in 1995 with a 
GDP growth of2.5% and inflation decrease from 122% in 1994 to 32.9% in 1995. But the 
reforms initiated by the right-wing government at that time were not continued by the successive 
governments, and with the socialist party obtaining majority in 1996, necessary reforms such as 
privatization and establishing a foreign-investment welcoming climate, were mismanaged and 
slowed down. This led to a collapse of the lev (the Bulgarian national currency), instability for 
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the decapitalized banks, bankruptcies of 14 banks, and hyperinflation of 311% that devoured 
people's savings. The United Nations Development Programme states that real salaries and 
pensions declined by 60%, and employment dropped by 8%. The average real wage also fell to 
$20 per month from $13 0 in previous years. This situation provoked a serious financial crisis 
and eroded the people's belief in the government. Widespread public protests and 
demonstrations were held throughout December 1996 and January 1997. Further, the socialist 
government withdrew from power in February 1997, and a transitional government reached an 
agreement with the IMF and the World Bank on the program of economic stabilization and 
structural reforms, including the establishment of a currency board to control inflation. The 
reform-dedicated government that took office in May 1997 adopted the currency board 
arrangement. 
What is a Currency Board? 
A condensed definition of a currency board is that it is an institution that issues a national 
currency at a strictly fixed rate of exchange with respect to the currency of another country 
(Miller & Van Hoose, 2004). But Anne-Marie Guide (1999) goes further, affirming that a 
currency board operates through the following four elements: a fixed exchange rate between the 
country's currency and an "anchor" currency; automatic convertibility (that is, the right to 
exchange domestic currency at the fixed rate whenever desired); prohibition on domestic credit 
creation by the central bank; and a long-term commitment to the system. All of these are often 
reflected in the country's central bank laws. Guide also states that the main reason for countries 
to adopt a currency board is to prove that they are serious about fighting inflation. 
Certain requirements make the currency board credible. First, a country's central bank 
needs to hold sufficient foreign exchange reserves to cover at least its entire monetary liabilities. 
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This way the public and investors know that every domestic-currency bill is backed by an 
equivalent amount of foreign currency; thus the trust in the anchor currency is transferred to the 
domestic one. As a result, holders of domestic currency know that their liquid money can be 
exchanged anytime into the major foreign currency, and demand for domestic currency rises. 
According to Gulde, Kahkonen, and Keller (2000), another requirement that contributes to the 
currency board credibility is the presence of a broad political support. This is important because 
the currency board imposes a sufficiently restrictive fiscal policy, and if the population and the 
politicians don't support it, a self-fulfilling speculative attack can undermine its efficiency. In 
addition, the country's financial system has to be reasonably healthy, allowing weak banks to 
fail. 
As in the case of fixed exchange rate regimes, the currency board controls the money 
supply, which in turn changes the interest rate to resemble the one of the anchor currency nation. 
Such foreign exchange outflows and inflows are controlled by an automatically reacting 
adjustment mechanism: in the case of a flight into the anchor currency, a money supply 
contraction is triggered, which changes the interest rate that counteract the actual movement of 
foreign exchange, and will also induce adjustments in output and employment. 
As a result, a currency board brings economic credibility, low inflation, and low interest 
rates- all these result in overall monetary stability. Compared to other less-extreme exchange-
rate regimes, such as a pegged exchange rate regime, which fixes a country's currency to an 
anchor currency but does not explicitly show a long-term commitment, on average currency 
boards perform better. Table 1 shows that the average inflation in countries that have adopted 
currency boards is about 4 percentage points lower than in countries with pegged exchange rates. 
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Table 1 
Macroeconomic Performance Under Alternative Exchange Regimes 
GDP 
Number of Inflation Growth GDP Growth Government 
observations Median Mean Growth ???? ?????? Balance 
Full Sample 1915 8.4 14.4 3.2 1.3 -4.4 
Currency Board 112 3.9 9.9 4.0 3.1 -2.7 
Other Pegged 1089 8.4 12.3 3.3 0.9 -4.6 
Float 714 9.2 18.2 3.1 1.7 -4.3 
Upper Income 814 6.0 13.4 3.1 2.0 -3.0 
Currency Board 44 4.0 12.1 5.7 4.6 -1.4 
Other Pegged 317 6.1 11.2 3.3 1.8 -1.9 
Float 453 6.2 15.1 2.8 1.9 -4.0 
Lower Income 1101 9.9 15.1 3.3 0.8 -5.4 
Currency Board 68 3.9 8.6 2.9 2.2 -3.9 
Other Pegged 772 9.4 12.8 3.3 0.5 -5.7 
Float 261 15.2 23.7 3.6 1.4 -5.0 
No capital Controls 465 5.6 13.3 3.3 1.8 -4.2 
Currency Board 21 6.0 12.4 3.8 3.1 -0.9 
Other Pegged 123 7.3 14.1 4.6 1.9 -5.1 
Float 321 5.0 13.0 2.7 1.6 -4.0 
Note. The data underlying this table is taken from the IMF's World Economic Outlook database, and cover all IMF 
members for which annual data on the exchange rate regime and key macroeconomic variables exist over the period 
1975-1996. From "Currency Boards: The Ultimate Fix?" by A.R. Ghosh, A. Gulde, and H.C. Wolf, 1998, Working 
Paper of the International Monetary Fund. 
In 2003 inflation in Bulgaria fell to 5.6%, which is 2.5 percentage points lower than the 8.1 mean 
inflation value for other pegged regimes. Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (1998) explain that this 
happened because of the imposed restrictions on local governments to manipulate money supply, 
but a greater factor is the improved confidence in the local currency that a currency board brings. 
With confidence, money demand rises and brings about lower inflation for a given growth rate of 
money supply. 
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According to the same study, on average countries with currency boards "grew faster 
economically than countries with either pegged exchange rates or floating exchange rates." And 
even though it is likely that this growth is caused by other factors in addition to the exchange rate 
regime, at least it is obvious that currency boards do not impair a country's growth. 
But despite the obvious advantages of a currency board, such as economic stability, low 
inflation, and low interest rates, it is not the ultimate solution for all problems. Gu?de (1999) 
points out that currency boards can prove limiting, especially for countries that have weak 
banking system or are prone to economic shocks (that is, shocks different from those 
experienced by the anchor currency country). The reason is that under a currency board the 
central bank is limited in the amount of credit that it can extend, thus not allowing it to serve as a 
lender of last resort for insolvent banks. Also, in case of an external shock, such as regional 
economic or political instability, the central bank cannot use financial policies, such as 
adjustments of domestic interest or exchange rates, to offset the negative effect on the economy. 
The only way such adjustments can be made is through wage and price adjustments, which can 
be both slower and more painful. But precisely this inability of the government to manipulate 
economic performance establishes the stability of the currency board arrangement. 
Bulgaria's Currency Board Adoption 
Initial Steps 
The March 1997 2,000% inflation rate, brought about by liquidity injections to support 
Bulgaria's weakening banking system, caused the confidence for the Bulgarian lev to fall. The 
central bank tried to reduce the currency's depreciation, and as a result, depleted its international 
reserves. Real output contracted by more than 10% during 1996. Examination ofthe 10 state 
banks in 1996, which accounted for more than 80% of deposits, showed that nine of them had 
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negative capital. Half of the private banks were also technically bankrupt. This news led to 
several runs on banks. The Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) tried to help by providing liquid 
assets, but this only fueled inflation. 
After several failed stabilization attempts, Bulgaria introduced a currency board on July 
1, 1997. Guide (1999) observes that it was controversial and difficult to implement "because of 
Bulgaria's serious structural problems" but has been also crucial in the success ofthe country's 
latest stabilization program. Bulgaria combined a traditional, rule-based exchange arrangement 
with legal and structural measures that addressed the banking sector and the country's fiscal 
policy, which brought the new system credibility. Still these measures were flexible enough to 
allow Bulgaria to fight and overcome a systematic banking crisis. 
Currency Board Framework Establishment 
According to Balino and Enoch (1997), currency board arrangements differ significantly 
from country to country in the choice of peg currency, the exchange rate, the organizational 
structure, and the operation principles and instruments. Faced with the choice between U.S. 
dollar and the deutsche mark (DM), Bulgaria chose as an anchor currency the DM, reflecting the 
country's intense trade relations with Germany, and desire ofhigher integration in the European 
Community. Consistent with the market value of the DM in May 1997, BNB decided on a fixed 
exchange rate of lev 1,000 to DM 1. Guide (1999) explained that Bulgaria decided to restructure 
its central bank, using the Bank of England as a model. This arrangement provided high 
transparency, dividing the BNB into three distinct departments: issue, banking, and banking 
supervision. Every month a full account for all departments was to be published. 
The issue department holds all the central bank's non-governmental liabilities. The BNB 
is required to have sufficient foreign exchange and gold assets at all time to cover these liabilities 
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in full. Furthermore, it has to honor all its liabilities on demand and without limit, according to 
the official exchange rate with the peg currency. 
The banking department is designed to hold foreign exchange in excess of the amount 
needed to cover the central bank's liabilities. This way, if an acute liquidity crisis occurs, the 
bank can extend collateralized loans to commercial banks. The banking department also holds 
all the bank's assets and claims, and acts as a fiscal agent for Bulgaria's relations with the IMF. 
In addition, a fiscal reserve account, holding funds available to the government, is part of 
the BNB's issue department. It is to be completely backed up with foreign currency and 
provides assurance that the government can honor its budgetary commitments. 
Furthermore, the IMF introduced and coordinated a major technical assistance program, 
which was supported by the European Union (EU) and the United States Agency for 
International Development. This was the banking supervision department in the new BNB 
structure. 
Actual Implementation 
The restructuring process had to be legitimized by a change in the constitution. Having 
the support of the Bulgarian parliament, the new BNB law was passed, and took effect on July 1, 
1997. This law provided for an onlending of??MF credits program, which had to stabilize the 
budget. 
The actual implementation of the currency board was done in several steps, initially with 
the currency board's opening balance on July 1, 1997, reflecting the new structure of the 
accounting framework. To avoid wide swings in liquid assets, large liquidity injections had to be 
absorbed by special treasury bills. In addition, Bulgaria's foreign exchange had to show 
consistency with the peg to the deutsche mark. In order to have an adequate supply of deutsche 
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mark banknotes, in about 1,500 cash transactions, the BNB bought more than DM 3 million, 
while selling less than DM 1,000. At the end ofthe first day of these interbank transactions, the 
total increase of foreign assets held by the BNB was "more than DM 40 million"?(Gulde, 1999). 
The Effects of Currency Board Adoption 
Immediate Results 
Following Bulgaria's currency board adoption, a number of economic indicators began to 
improve right away, reducing annual inflation to 13% by mid-1998 and to 1% by the end of 1998 
(Guide, 1999). Foreign exchange reserves were also rebuilt from levels ofless than $800 million 
to more than $3 billion. This accumulated surplus strengthened the capacity for future 
investment and economic growth. Furthermore, as depicted in Figure 1, the BNB 's basic interest 
rate, having reached levels of above 200% at the worst of Bulgaria's economic crisis, fell to 
5.2% by the end of 1998. As expected, retail interest rates moved close to German levels as soon 
as the currency board was introduced. 
An important indicator of the banking stability is that since the establishment of the 
currency board, no bank had to be supported through the banking department. Following 
declines in GDP in both 1996 and 1997, the economy grew at an officially estimated 3.5% in 
1998 and 2.5% in 1999. Wikipedia (2003) cites that in September 1988, thelMF approved a 
three-year Extended Fund Facility, which provided credits worth approximately $900 million, 
designed to support Bulgaria's reform efforts. 
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Figure 1. Baltics and Bulgaria: Consumer Price Index inflation levels in the period 1994-1999. 
Supplied by Guide et al. (2000). 
Long-term Developments and Challenges 
The Bulgarian government's strong commitment to bringing financial stability has led to 
the successful completion of the three-year standby agreement with the IMF. This agreement 
was renewed at the end of 2001 for the amount of $300 million, and its goal is to support 
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Bulgaria's balance of payments during the period of macro-economic stabilization and structural 
reforms. It has specifically supported government efforts in overcoming high rates of poverty 
and unemployment. In February 2004, after completing the fourth review of the Bulgaria's 
economic performance, the Executive Board of the IMF approved the disbursement of about $39 
million to the country. This payment is part of the new two-year stand-by agreement, amounting 
to total of about $358 million, of which Bulgaria has drawn $281 million by the present. In 
response to this agreement, Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair of 
the IMF, stated that such an approval comes as a result of prudent and flexible fiscal policy, and 
a broad program of structural reforms in Bulgaria. She concludes that these policies have 
resulted in "robust growth, low inflation, and declining unemployment rate, although the high 
external current account deficit poses risks" (Novinite, 2004). 
But transition is still far from complete, and it is important to consider a currency board 
arrangement as but one element of a stabilization program. Although it will, if properly 
designed, contribute to eliminating macroeconomic imbalances, its long-term survival depends 
equally on the implementation of appropriate supporting measures. Such important measures are 
privatization, and where appropriate, liquidation of state-owned enterprises; liberalization of 
agricultural policies, including creating conditions for the development of a land market; reform 
of the country's social insurance programs, and reforms, strengthening contract enforcement and 
fight crime and corruption. 
But despite the robust growth of the Bulgarian economy that is observed recent years, 
low work productivity still remains a feature of the transition period. An important contributor 
has been the low level of overall investment in the country, which in 2001 was below 20% of 
GDP. Therefore, investments have been insufficient so far to create enough new jobs for the 
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redundant workers and unemployment remains high (18-19%), as depicted in Table 2 (Sorsa, 
2002). 
Table 2 
Bulgaria's ????Economic Indicators 1995-2001 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
GDP Growth% 2.9 -10.1 -7 3.5 2.4 5.8 4.5 
Inflation% 34 310 579 1 6.2 11.4 4.8 
National Exchange 
rate (Leva/US$) 71 487 1776 1675 1947 2.2 2.2 
Unemployment Rate 11 12.5 14 12 16 20.3 19.7 
Monthly Wage (US$) 130 56 108 128 122 122 126 
Total Revenues 
(%?GDP) 36 32 33 39.5 42.5 37 22.2 
Total Expenditures 
(%?GDP) 41 42 36 38 43.5 38 25.3 
Fiscal Balance 
(%?GDP) -5.6 -10.4 -3 1 -1 1 -3 
Note: From "Bulgarian Early Warning Reports" 
Nevertheless, foreign direct investment has increased from $34 million in 1992 to$ 750 
million in 1999. Bulgaria has also been able to recover its exports, by shifting from exporting 
raw materials to consumer goods, which make up 40% of Bulgaria's total exports to the EU 
(United Nations Development Programme). In addition, in 1998, a first general government 
surplus of 1% of GDP was recorded. 
But on the other hand, in the late 90s, Bulgaria also experienced a confluence of shocks 
that temporarily stalled the recovery. These shocks have included weak external demand and 
prices, the crisis in nearby Kosovo, and adjustment strains related to accelerated enterprise 
privatization and restructuring. Nevertheless, according to Ghosh et al. (1998), the Bulgarian 
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government has persisted with sound macroeconomic policies and intensive structural reform 
throughout this period. As a result, signs of a renewed recovery were present in early 2000, with 
an outlook for solid growth. 
The Relationship Between a Currency Board and Slow Economic Growth 
A currency board system is by design very constrictive for it removes, or at least severely 
limits, the scope for discretionary policy. In fact, it is as if the government has put on a strait 
jacket, for the central bank is restricted, as discussed later, in its actions. A nation's central bank 
is the mechanism through which the objectives of monetary policy are reached. In a discussion 
about the role of a country's central bank, Miller and Van Hoose (2004) state that domestic 
monetary policy often aims for a "low, and stable inflation, high and stable output growth, and 
high and stable employment." External-balance objectives, such as a country's trade balance, are 
also in the scope of monetary policy. The central bank can achieve these objectives by directly 
reaching its monetary policy targets or by influencing a target variable. In the former case, the 
central bank achieves optimal levels of inflation, output, employment, or other objectives 
through (1) changing the total quantity of deposits in the banking system (by buying or selling 
U.S. government securities), (2) varying reserve requirements and thus affecting the amount of 
money in circulation, or through (3) changing the discount rate that the central bank charges 
private banks when they borrow from it. But the central bank often chooses to enforce its 
monetary policy by influencing specific economic variables such as credit aggregates, interest 
rates, nominal GDP, and exchange rates. This is a preferred approach because intermediate 
target variables should be "observable with greater frequency than ultimate goal variables, easy 
to measure, subject to influence through monetary policy actions, and closely related to ultimate 
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policy objectives" (Miller & Van Hoose, 2004). All these functions are greatly restricted in the 
presence of a currency board, for its objective is stability through monetary discipline. 
Currency boards constrain credit policy and the ability of the authorities to alter the 
exchange rate in order to stimulate the economy more than do pegged regimes. For instance, 
countries with major economic powers can affect international interest rates, and thus lead an 
independent monetary policy in their favor. Nevertheless, not many countries are in such 
position. But even in that case, an economically large country would be diversified across 
sectors and would face fewer aggregate shocks, which could be possibly offset by a change in 
the exchange rate. Furthermore, it is rarely the case that nominal exchange rate adjustments 
would directly translate into desired real exchange rate movements (Ghosh et al., 1998). 
A greater cost ofthe central bank's being limited is its reduced ability to act as a lender of 
last resort if a system-wide liquidity crisis occurs. But supplementary reforms, such as 
expanding labor market and wage flexibility, limited purchases of domestic assets, and foreign 
branch banking, can alleviate the impact of a liquidity crunch. However, both Ghosh et al. 
(1998) and Osband (1992) point out that ''there is a general presumption that adopting a currency 
board is likely to create, at least in the short run, a trade-off between lower inflation and an 
increased risk of real exchange rate misalignments and financial distress." But on the positive 
side, precisely these constraints give stability and credibility to the country under a currency 
board. This way investors and citizens know that the government would not undertake 
irresponsible policies, which would hinder the economy in the long run. 
And even more convincing is the economic data collected from different countries under 
a currency board. As a result of an in-depth study by Ghosh et al. (1998), little evidence was 
found that currency boards result in more sluggish economic growth. On the contrary, countries 
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with currency boards eJtioyed significantly higher growth rates compared to other forms of fixed 
exchange regimes. Thus, even though currency board adoption is no "quick fix" for an 
economy, the fiscal discipline that it imposes does not seem to deteriorate growth on average. 
The transparency of policies and the policy discipline under currency boards appear to have 
supported, rather than hindered, the transition from centrally planned to market economies, and 
promoted the nominal and real convergence of their economies toward those ofEU members. 
Currency Board Arrangement in the Eve of Bulgaria's EU Accession 
Bulgaria's ultimate goal is joining the EU as a full member, making the country an 
integrated part ofEurope's large economy-based family. A major issue in relation to this is the 
importance of Bulgaria's currency board in the eve of the country's adoption of the euro. Guide 
et al. (2000) assert that in light of Bulgaria's favorable experience with the currency board 
arrangement, and the country's willingness to maintain the necessary policy discipline, there 
appears to be little reason for it to abandon the currency board prior to EU accession. 
Furthermore, accession for Bulgaria is still several years down the road and an exit from the 
currency board arrangement could "confuse market participants and the public, destabilizing 
expectation and damaging the credibility of these governments' policies." Nevertheless, several 
arguments can still be made in favor of moving to a more flexible regime, and thus allowing 
some exchange rate variability. This would reveal whether the country's macro policies stand up 
to the test of ensuring adequate exchange rate stability. Such a regime would allow for monetary 
institutions and officials in Bulgaria to gain experience with active monetary policy management 
prior to European Monetary Union (EMU) accession. 
But at the same time, a number of considerations suggest that the currency board 
arrangement could be the best regime that would lead up to Bulgaria's joining the EU. One such 
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is that tests of the exchange rate stability could be accomplished in the context of the currency 
board arrangement, by measuring clear indicators like the levels of reserves, monetary 
aggregates, growth performance, and interest rates. These would provide unambiguous facts on 
whether the requirement of interest rate convergence before the adoption of the euro is met, 
which is an important financial stability criterion. Additionally, the currency board has a built-in 
adjustments mechanism, helping to ensure the desired level of the exchange rate. And because 
Bulgaria is already pegged to the euro, the requirements for good economic performance are 
already very similar to those of EMU participants. Therefore, even though temporary 
disequilibria are possible, and it is important that exchange rate pegs are not maintained by 
excessive recourse to foreign borrowing or at the expense of growth, if the economy has proven 
to possess the necessary flexibility to adjust relative prices and reallocate resources under the 
currency board, severe misalignment is hardly possible. Guide et al. (2000) also hold that such 
results can be achieved via a viable currency board if output and export growth are robust. And 
even though price level shocks and some inflation can be expected, as a result of the introduction 
of the EU's agricultural pricing system, the harmonization of excise tax rates, and the completion 
of price liberalization, should not be seen as a sign of policy weakness or as endangering 
economic growth. They would only reflect relative price adjustments, rather than 
macroeconomic imbalances. 
And even though joining the EU seems feasible, Bulgaria has several more challenges to 
face. In particular, fiscal policies need to remain conservative in order to avoid undue build-up 
of debt. Where necessary, the financial sector needs to be strengthened, so that it can show 
better resistance to shocks. Structural reforms need to be pursued vigorously to maintain and 
increase economic flexibility. Such flexibility is particularly important in the labor market, 
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because in addition to wage flexibility, the traditionally low labor mobility needs to be increased, 
and institutional rigidities have to be reduced (Guide et al., 2000). Will Bulgaria be able to meet 
these challenges? It is a matter oftime, but Bulgaria's current experience gives some confidence. 
Bulgaria's economy has already been hit by severe shocks, and has so far remained stable. With 
continued determination to maintain policy discipline, Bulgaria may be able to benefit from 
currency boards up until it is ready to adopt the euro. 
Conclusion 
Research has shown that Bulgaria's experience with a currency board arrangement has 
lead to several major structural and economic reforms. The inflation crisis of 1996 had brought 
political, social, and economic instability, and perhaps the only framework that could impede it 
was the rigid, but steady structure of a currency board regime. An observation of both the 
immediate and the long-term economic developments shows that the currency board 
implementation in Bulgaria has proven to be successful. Some of the major accomplishment 
indicators are the inflation rate levels being brought under control, the population's reestablished 
trust in the banking system, the creation of an attractive climate for foreign investment, and the 
successful conclusion of a large part of the privatization process. Despite the firm and somewhat 
restrictive control that a currency board imposes on domestic, fiscal, and monetary policy, and 
the unfortunate occurrence of several external crises that seriously impaired Bulgaria's economy, 
the country's recovery is not blocked, but on the contrary, steady growth and stability exists. 
And even though productivity growth and employment have not reached optimal levels, the 
government needs to continue working with the International Monetary Fund on ways to 
promote this desired progress through real economic growth, which is not exclusively dependent 
on foreign investment but also on domestic entrepreneurship initiatives. Therefore, Bulgaria 
Currency Board 19 
needs to continue the promotion of substantial political, legal, and structural reforms, thus 
making the task of the current and future governments not an easy one. The already established 
framework of Bulgaria's currency board can prove very helpful throughout this development and 
can also provide vital support in Bulgaria's meeting the requirements for its EMU accession. 
And even though much more must be accomplished, Bulgaria has shown that it has the will and 
the commitment to pursue the stability and growth objectives, which would make it strong in a 
market-based economy. Still, I occasionally become frustrated with the insufficient speeds of 
vital reforms, but at the same time I sincerely believe that the worst is already behind us. I am 
convinced that that Bulgaria is on its inevitable way towards joining the European community, 
which would significantly accelerate my country's economic development. And I firmly believe 
that these hopes could not have been real today without the large past and present contribution of 
the IMF's currency board. 
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